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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
BOSWORTH, SULLIVAN AND COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Utah State University (hereinafter the "Uni-
versity"), claiming that it does not wish to burden the Court 
with a separate statement of facts on the issue of liability 
and further stating that its Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
rnent is not dependent upon the acceptance of one or another 
version of the facts, nevertheless recites in its brief a 13 
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page version of facts it asserts are contrary to the state-
ment of facts which appears in the main brief of appellant 
Bosworth, Sullivan & Company (hereinafter "Bosworth"). 
The statement of facts in the Bosworth brief is sup-
ported by the record and on this appeal must be accepted as 
true for the purposes of ascertaining the propriety of grant-
ing the University's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Therefore, it must be accepted as true that Bosworth's 
execution of securities orders was at the request of the 
University's investment officer, Donald A. Catron, and that 
Bosworth executed such securities solely as agent and pur-
suant to a corporate resolution duly passed by the Institu-
tional Counsel authorizing Catron, the University's agent 
"to purchase, trade and sell long or short, transfer and 
assign, stocks, bonds and securities of every nature on 
margin or otherwise." The University now seeks restitution 
of monies paid to Bosworth for stocks purchased pursuant to 
such authorization. 
It is the University's position that the purchase of 
securities by the University, through Bosworth as its agent, 
was ultra vir:_e~ and, therefore, the University is entitled 
to return all of the monies paid for such securities. 
The University states that it seeks only to have this 
court determine whether the brokers or the taxpayers should 
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bear the loss from these transactions. What the University 
actually seeks is equitable relief from its own acts, and to 
punish an innocent party because of its reliance upon resolu-
tions of authorized government agencies. Fundamental fair-
ness compels reversal of the judgment of the court below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
BOSWORTH IS LIABLE TO THE UNIVERSITY. 
At page 15 of its brief, the University states that 
the decision in First Equity Corporation of Florida v. 
Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975), disposes 
of most arguments contained in Bosworth's brief. 
In reality, however, First Equity determined only that 
the broker could not enforce its contracts with the Univer-
sity, because those agreements were ultra vires. Such a 
ruling, in accord with settled law as to executory contracts, 
is not applicable to executed contracts. If anything, First 
Equity requires this court to leave the parties where it 
finds them and deny the University rescission of the executed 
transactions. 
The University implicitly acknowledges that it seeks 
to extend the holding in First Equity by arguing at page 22 
of its brief why such an extension should be made. The 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
University leads its series of cases purporting to establish 
authority for such an extension with Miller v. McKinnon, 124 
P.2d 34 (Cal. 1942), said to be authority that public monies 
expended pursuant to unlawful contracts may be recovered. 
In Miller a taxpayer brought suit to recover monies paid to 
a contractor by a county government, alleging violation of a 
state competitive bidding statute. The lower court's dis-
missal was reversed on appeal to the California Supreme Court, 
which found that the taxpayer's Complaint stated a claim for 
relief. In Mille~, both the county and the contractor were 
accused of violating a specific statute in effect throughout 
the course of the parties' dealings. The court held that 
the contractor should be presumed to know the law with 
respect to the requirement of competitive bidding, and that 
such contractor acts at its peril when it fails to follow 
specific statutory requirements. Moreover, the taxpayer's 
Complaint alleged that the contractor charged exorbitant 
amounts for labor and materials. 
Miller is inapposite to the case at bar, where no speci-
fie statutory prohibition is involved. In this case, not 
only are there no facts which would allow a presumption that 
Bosworth knew or should have known that the University's 
transactions in securities were ~ltra ~ire~, but the authori-
zation under which Catron acted is dispositive evidence to 
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the contrary. And in this case. there is no allegation that 
Bosworth took any advantage of or acted wrongfully in its 
dealings with the University. 
Miller is also contrary to the Utah case of ~oe v. 
Millard County School District 54 Utah 144, 179 Pac. 980 
(1919). As discussed in Bosworth's main brief, the contrac-
tor in Moe entered into an agreement with the Millard County 
School District to supply fixtures for a school building 
The contract was declared void because it exceeded the con-
stitutional debt limit. While recognizing that the contrac-
tor could not recover money owing on an ultra vires contract, 
(the First Equi_!y case) the court held that the contractor 
should not be required to refund any of the purchase price 
previously paid by the school district (this case). 
The University also cites ?tate v. Axtell, 393 P.2d 
451, 454 (N.M. 1964), calling it a leading case allowing 
recovery under the rule that public bodies can recover monies 
paid out under mistake of law. That opinion, however, ac-
tually supports the position asserted here by Bosworth. 
The ~xtel.1-_ opinion discusses the case of Tobin v. Town 
Council, 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P.2d 666 (1933), which held that 
the city of Sundance could not recover monies paid under an 
illegal contract because the city had retained the benefits 
it received That same position is asserted by Bosworth 
-5-
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here. Axtell distinguished Tobin and other cases like Tobin 
on the ground that Tobin was an action to recover monies 
paid in good faith after services have been rendered and 
could not be compared with the situation that existed in 
AxteJl, which involved a gratuitous payment by the state to 
a seller of feed furnished to farmers in an emergency. The 
court stated: 
In any event, we would observe that the 
cases relied upon by the appellees mainly in-
volved attempts, under laws found to be uncon-
stitutional, to recover monies paid in good 
faith after the services had been rendered. 
The cases mentioned are distinguishable and 
cannot be compared with a situation in which 
there is an outright gift. 393 P.2d at 456. 
Therefore, Axtell supports Bos~orth, not the University. 
The University further cites Gerzof v. ~weeney, 264 N.Y.S. 
2d 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965), in support of its assertion that 
it can somehow um1ind these executed transactions. In Gerzof, 
as in Miller, a contractor installed a generator for a city 
in violation of the state competitive bidding law. The court, 
swayed by the fact that the very purpose of the bidding law 
was to prohibit contractors from making unfair charges at the 
expense and to the detriment of local taxpayers, held that 
the generator was nonreturnable and that the contractor 
should be required to pay the village the difference between 
the price of the generator and a competitor's bid for a 
smaller generator. gerzof is no more on point than is 
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M~, addresses no legel issue relevant to the case at 
bar, and affords no support for the University's position. 
At page 30 of its brief, the University "string cites" 
without comment 28 cases (none from this jurisdiction) which 
the University states support its position. 
Bosworth could "string cite" as many or more. In an 
A.L.R. annotation entitled "The Right of a Municipality or 
Other Public Bos!Y..t or Taxpayer, to Recover Back Payments 
Made Under Invalid or Unenforceable Contract," 140 A L.R. 
583- there are over 50 cases supporting Bosworth's position 
generally. The annotation states: 
Lack of any evidence of bad faith in the 
execution of an invalid or unenforceable public 
contract under which public funds have been ex-
pended, or lack of any evidence of collusion 
between the contractor and the public authorities 
in the execution of such contract, are occasion-
ally relied on by the courts in sustaining their 
refusal to permit recovery back of sums paid 
under such contracts. See, in this connection, 
the following cases: Sacramento County v. 
Southern P. Co. (1899)127 Cal. 217, 59 P. 568, 
825, set out infra, III a 2; Culver ex rel. Long-
year v. Brown (1932) 259 Mich. 294, 243 N.W.~ 
set out infra, III b 4; ?illager v. Hewett (1906) 
98 Minn. 265, 107 N.W. 815, set out infra, III a 3; 
Witmer v. Nichols (1928) 320 Mo. 665, 8 S.W.2d. 63, 
set out infra, III b 4; Schell City v. Rumsey 
Mfg. Co. (189) (1890) 39 Mo. App. 264, set out 
infra III a 3; ~zka v. Board of Education (1926) 
126 Misc. 622, 214 N.Y.S. 264, set out infra, 
III b 4; Bartron v. Codington County (S.D.) 
(reported herewith) ante, 550: Tobin v. Sundance 
(1933) 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P.2d 666, 84 A.L.R. 902, 
set out infra, III a 3. 140 A.L.R. at 588. 
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In this case Bosworth made every reasonable effort to 
obtain and did in fact obtain proof that the University had 
authority to enter into the transactions before it acted as 
the University's agent. It has been neither alleged nor 
shown that Bosworth acted in bad faith in discharge of its 
agency obligation to the University, nor has it been alleged 
or shown that Bosworth and the University have colluded to 
the taxpayer's detriment. 
POINT II 
THE UNIVERSITY IS ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING 
RECOVERY. 
The University asserts that a government cannot be 
estopped and, therefore, traditional estoppel principles 
are inapplicable to this action. 
It is clear as an initial matter that the traditional 
elements of estoppel are present in this case. The Univer-
sity officers and its Institutional Council were fully advised 
of the University's investment program, the kinds of stocks 
being purchased and sold, and the precise identity, cost and 
sales price of every stock actually purchased and sold. The 
University intended that its conduct would be acted upon. 
The University's corporate resolution had for its purpose to 
allow the University to open and maintain an account with 
Bosworth. Bosworth was ignorant of the true facts, and 
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relied to its detriment on the University's conduct. There-
fore, unless estoppel principles do not apply to government 
entities, the University is estopped from seeking restitution. 
That this Court will apply equitable estoppel to govern-
mental entities was recently reaffirmed in Celebrity Club, 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 
1979). In Celebrity, the plaintiff wished to open a private 
club where liquor would be sold and requested from the Liquor 
Commission an opinion determining whether the premises at 
which the club was to be situated would comply with Utah Code 
Annotated, §16-6-13.5, which provides that such an establish-
ment may not be located within 600 feet of a school. The 
Utah State Liquor Commission issued a letter to petitioner 
advising him that the locat~on of the premises was in compli-
ance with the statute. The plaintiff thereupon acted in 
reliance upon that letter. Sometime later, the Commission 
advised the plaintiff that the sale of liquor on the premises 
would be in violation of the statute and accordingly refused 
to issue plaintiff a liquor license. In a suit to compel 
issuance of the license, this Court held that all the ele-
ments of estoppel had been made out and that the Commission 
was estopped to deny the plaintiff a liquor license on the 
grounds that it did not comply with the statute. The Court 
stated that those elements were: (1) an admission, statement, 
-9-
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or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) 
action by the other party on the faith of such admission, 
statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party result-
ing from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
such admission, statement, or act. 602 P.2d at 694. 
The uncontroverted facts of this case, when applied to 
the ruling of Celebrity Club, confirm that the University is 
estopped as a matter of law. The University issued a resolu-
tion affirming its authority to enter into purchase of common 
stocks. Such resolution is the admission, statement or act 
designated in Celebrity Club. Bosworth, the other party, 
relied upon the resolution by acting as agent in the securi-
ties transactions for the University. Bosworth stands to be 
injured in the amount of over $1,000,000 if the University 
is to be allowed to repudiate its specific representation. 
Under the holding in Celebrity Club, a more compelling case 
of estoppel than the uncontroverted facts in this case is 
not readily imaginable. 
The University's own case, Petty v. B0.£:1, 106 Utah 224, 
150 P.2d 776 (1944) is inapplicable to this case. In ~e!!_y, 
the court found that the plaintiff's activities which were 
claimed to have estopped the federal government were not 
done for the government at all and that the plaintiff never 
intended that his actions bind the government. In this 
-10-
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case, the Institutional Council did act on behalf of the 
University and did intend to bind the University. 
Finally, the University seems to assert that there is 
some public policy reason for allowing a government entity 
unilaterally to repudiate its agreements while retaining the 
benefits thereof. The holding in Celebrity Club is to the 
contrary. This court in Celebrity Club stated: 
The conduct of government should always be 
scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens; 
and where a public official, acting within its 
authority and with knowledge of the pertinent 
facts, has made a commitment and the party to 
whom it was made has acted to its detriment in 
reliance on that commitment, officials should 
not be permitted to revoke that commitment. 602 
P.2d at 695. 
The University has failed to demonstrate any reason 
why this court should depar~ from the holding of Celebrity 
Club. The uncontroverted facts in this case present a clear 
case for the application of estoppel principles. Estoppel, 
therefore, bars the University's claim. 
POINT III 
THE UNIVERSITY'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE 
EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS. 
The University states that Bosworth's defense of unclean 
hands is inapplicable because eguitable relief is not sought. 
Perhaps the University's difficulty in the characterization 
of its claim stems froQ the unprecedented nature of the claim. 
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Its confusion is manifestea by reliance upon a lengthy excerpt 
from Gerzof for the proposition that its cause of action was 
recognized at common law. However, as the quoted passage 
clearly indicates, the claim in Gerzof was based, not on the 
common law, but upon a statute. Moreover, the plaintiff's 
own complaint, in its prayer for judgment, seeks restitution, 
an equitable remedy, of the purchase price for securities 
which have not been sold. 
To the extent that the University seeks equitable relief, 
Bosworth's defense of unclean hands is a bar. 
A specific and uncontroverted instance of unclean hands 
is the failure of the University to notify Bosworth after 
December 15, 1972, when the University was alerted by the 
Attorney General's office concerning a problem regarding 
legality of the University's investments. Most of Bosworth's 
transactions for the University occurred between December 
15, 1972 and March, 1973, when the University for the first 
time notified Bosworth that the corporate resolution upon 
which Bosworth relied was no longer in effect. 
The University asserts that because of widespread publi-
city in Salt Lake City and Logan concerning the Attorney 
General's opinion, Bosworth cannot complain of lack of notice. 
The fact of the matter is, however, that the University offi-
cials who enacted the corporate resolution, knowing that 
-12-
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that resolution was in effect until written notice was given 
Bosworth to the contrary, failed to give such notice. To 
this date, the University has given no reason for the delay. 
Further, the University, aware that its authority to 
invest in common stocks was in question in December of 1972, 
failed to notify Bosworth of such question until March of 
1973. The facts show that the University affirmatively and 
wrongfully induced Bosworth to act to its detriment. The 
University has not done equity and, therefore, may not turn 
to equity for relief. 
POINT IV 
VENUE IS IMPROPER IN CACHE COUNTY. 
The University states that the specific venue provi-
sion applicable to this action is Utah Code Annotated, 
§78-13-7, allowing actions not covered by other specific 
venue statutes to be tried in the county in which the cause 
of action arose. All parties concur that the cause of 
action arises where the wrong occurs. 
The gist of the University's complaint is that Catron 
exceeded his authority in purchasing and selling speculative 
stock on behalf of the University, that the University 
itself had no authorization to purchase or sell such stock, 
that Bosworth was allegedly aware of the limitations of 
-13-
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authority and power (altho~g~ the ~nivers1ty ne~er exfla1ns 
why Bosworth should have i:>een better able to anticipate the 
Attorney General's opinion than the Vniversity itself), and 
that the University suffered damages caused thereby. 
Such a cause of action arose, if at all, in Salt La~e 
County. The University's securities trading account with 
Bosworth was opened in Bosworth's Salt Lake County office. 
All orders for the purchase or sale of securities were 
entered by the University at Bosworth's Salt Lake County 
office. All new accounts documents and authorizations by 
the University were submitted to Bosworth's Salt Lake County 
office. Bosworth did nothing in Cache County. 
However, the University states that the wrong occurred 
in Cache County because the University illegally paid 
out monies there. This argument is indicative of the 
difficulties encumbering the claim for relief. The Uni-
versity apparently maintains, and states in its argument on 
venue, that since the only wrong committed was the wrong com-
mitted by the University, that wrong had to have occurred in 
Cache County. Bosworth agrees with the University that the 
acts, if any, committed in this case were committed by the 
University. What the University does not, and cannot, 
explain is why its own wrongful acts affect venue as to the 
named defendants. The plaintiff University cannot lay venue 
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under Utah Code Annotated, S78-13-7, nor any other statute, 
until it can allege a wrongful act by someone other than 
itself. 
The University further argues that the its banks in 
Cache County were agents of Bosworth, making venue proper in 
Cache County. For this proposition, the University relies 
upon Utah Code Annotated, S70A-4-201(1) (1953), which provides 
that a collecting bank is an agent or sub-agent of the owner 
of an item prior to the time of settlement. This statute, 
part of the Utah Corr~ercial Code, was never intended to 
determine a venue question. Nor can the banks in Logan 
be deemed agents of Bosworth in the traditional, common law 
sense, thus disposing of the venue question. 
Finally, the University's claim that venue may be pro-
perly laid in each and every county in this state simply ig-
nores the venue statutes and relevant case law. 
POINT V 
BOS~ORTH'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAI~T FOR 
INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION STATED CLAIMS 
UPON WHICH RELIEF C~..N BE GRANTED. 
Bosworth's third-party claims are directed against 
the University's officers and members of its Institutional 
Council and are based on theories of implied contract, 
warranty, implied warranty, misrepresentation, inderr.nity, 
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subrogation and conduct outside the scope of authority. The 
court below granted the third-party defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted. In so doing, the lower court held as a matter 
of law that under no conceivable state of facts could those 
persons who actively implemented and supervised the Univer-
sity's investment program be required to indemnify Bosworth 
against loss. 
The third-party aefendants assert that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity shields the individuzl defendants because 
public officials may not be held personally liable for acts 
performed in good faith and within the scope of their duties. 
What the third-party defendants overlook is that the Univer-
sity's claim against Bosworth is entirely predicated on the 
theory that what these individuals did was entirely ultra 
vires and thus not within the scope of their duties. On the 
University's theory of liability, as to which Bosworth seeks 
indemnity, sovereign immunity affords no shelter to the indi-
vidual third-party defendants. 
In Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1128 (1936), 
this Court, having stated the general rule that "a municipal 
officer is immune from liability in a private suit for his 
acts in the discharge of corporate duties in the absence of 
willful negligence, malice, or corruption constituting mis-
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feasance," stated the corollary to that rule, making it 
clear that a public officer "may not, however, claim immunity 
for the commission of an act entirely outside the scope of 
his official duties." 57 P.2d at 1131. Thus, if the trans-
actions were, as the University asserts, ultra vires, the 
individual defendants did not discharge a corporate duty, 
but rather acted beyond their authority, power, or jurisdic-
tion. Under Ro~, therefore, the individual defendants may 
not claim sovereign immunity. 
Similarly, in Garff v. Smith, 31 Utah 102, 87 Pac. 
772 (1906), the court held that since the complaint did not 
allege that, in performing their duties, the defendants 
acted beyond the scope of their authority or that they acted 
without or in excess of their jurisdiction, a state sheep 
inspector and others were not liable for their negligence in 
quarantining plaintiff'& sheep. The Third-Party Complaint of 
Bosworth clearly states that, if it is liable to the Univer-
sity, it will be due to the fact that the individual third-
party defendants acted without the scope of their authority 
and jurisdiction and that such acts of the individual defen-
dants were ultra vires. 
There are numerous cases in accord with this proposition. 
See Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44 P.2d 1083 (1935) 
(officers performing discretionary acts "may become civilly 
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liable for the acts in excess of authority or where there is 
a total want of jurisdiction,"); Hjorth v. Whittenberg, 121 
Utah 324, 328, 241 P.2d 907 (1952) (Utah State Road Commis-
sioners were entitled to immunity because they were exercis-
ing "duties imposed upon them and authorized by law"); Blon-
quist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d 430 (1971) 
(if county officials were mistaken with respect to jurisdic-
tional facts upon which they acted, then they could be 
personally liable to plaintiff). 
The cases cited by the individual third-party defen-
dants also establish that sovereign immunity is of no aid 
to them. For example, in Anderson v. Granite School District, 
17 Utah 2d 405, 413 P.2d 597 (1966), the court merely noted 
the general rule that public officials are immune from dam-
ages for acts committed within the scope of their authority. 
The court was not called upon to determine that the public 
officials had committed acts totally without their power, as 
the University claims in this case. 
The third-party defendants' reliance upon Lister v. 
Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976) is 
also misplaced. In Lister, four former University of 
Wisconsin law students sought to recover the difference 
between non-resident and resident tuition which they had 
paid for two school years. The named defendants were the 
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University's System Board of Regents and the Registrar of 
the University of Wisconsin. The only "excess of authority" 
asserted by the plaintiffs against the Registrar was his 
alleged misinterpretation of the standard set forth in the 
state statutes which governed the resident/non-resident 
determination. The court held that the Registrar could 
properly assert official immunity in response to this claim 
of a simple error in judgment in exercising his statutory 
authority, as he was expressly empowered to make the resident 
/non-resident decision. 
Immediately following the text quoted by the third 
party defendants in their brief, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
went on to state that: 
.•• there is no substantive liability 
for damages resulting 'from mistakes and judgment 
where the officer is specifically empowered to 
exercise such judgment. 
Since the University's theory of liability against Bosworth 
is based upon the actions of the third party defendants, 
actions as to which they were not specifically empowered to 
exercise any kind of judgment, Lister affords them no 
support. 
Similarly misplaced is the third-party defendants' 
reliance on McQuillan for the proposition that public 
officials will not be held liable on contracts which they 
execute. Again, almost immediately following the passage 
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quoted by the third-party defendants, McQuillan states that 
"if public officers in making contracts go beyond or exceed 
the authority given them, they may become personally liable." 
4 McQuillan, 12.214, at 160. 
The third party defendants, without whose resolution 
Bosworth would never have conducted these transactions at 
all, should not be allowed to invoke immunity to shield the 
conduct in these cases. 
POINT VI 
BOSWORTH'S CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY STATES A 
CLAIM FOR RELIEF. 
The third-party individual defendants also claim that 
Bosworth is barred from seeking indemnity because of active 
participation in the events giving rise to liability. How-
ever, the only claim in the University's Complaint upon which 
Bosworth could be liable is that the University had no power 
to enter into the transactions complained of. Bosworth's 
liability, if any, is tounded upon the legal status of the 
University and upon Bosworth's alleged constructive knowledge 
that the University's authority was not what the individual 
defendants, all of them officers of the University, repre-
sented it to be. Bosworth was not an active wrongdoer. 
On the other hand, the allegations in Bosworth's Third-
Party Complaint, which must be taken as true for purposes of 
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this appeal, are that the individual third-party defendants 
passed a resolution authorizing Catron to purchase and sell 
securities on behalf of the University and warranted in that 
resolution that Catron had at all times "the authority in 
every way to bind and obligate the University for the carry-
ing out of any contract or transaction which shall, for and 
in behalf of this corporation, be entered into or made with 
or through the brokers." Such resolution was a necessary 
prerequisite to any transaction complained of herein. 
The individual third-party defendants state that as the 
broker played an essential role in the transactions giving 
rise to liability and because there is no difference in the 
culpability of the brokers and respondents sufficient to 
justify the indemnity action, that action must be dismissed. 
However, it is not the transactions which give rise to liabi-
lity, it is the post-determined illegality thereof. Moreover, 
Bosworth has pleaded that there is in fact a difference 
between its behavior and the enactment of a resolution, 
through which Bosworth became involved in the first place, 
and has stated facts to support its pleading. There is a 
significant difference between the brokers' and the respon-
dents' culpability. The Third-Party Complaint is sufficient 
to withstand a Motion to Dismiss. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Bosworth respectfully re-
quests this Court to reverse the ruling of the court below, 
and to direct the District Court to enter judgment in favor 
of Bosworth on its Motion to Dismiss. 
In the alternative, Bosworth requests this Court to 
reverse the rulings of the court below granting the Univer-
sity's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Bosworth's 
Third-Party Complaint against the individual defendants, and 
in denying Bosworth's Motion for Change of Venue and to 
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with 
this court's opinion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By~~Jff------
Attorneys for Appellant 
Bosworth, Sullivan et al. 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
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STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
NORMA F. CROSSLEY, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen 
and Martineau, Attorneys for Appellant Bosworth, Sullivan 
and Company herein; that she served the attached Reply Brief 
of Appellant Bosworth, Sullivan and Company, Case No. 16274, 
upon the following persons by placing two true and correct 
copies thereof in an envelope addressed as follows: 
David L. Wilkinson 
Office of the Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. 
Michael Heyrend 
310 South Main Street, 12~h Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Darwin C. Hansen 
506 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Keith Taylor 
Daniel Allred 
79 South State Street 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and mailing the same, postage prepaid, on the 11 7H day of 
April, 1980. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _j_J_ day of 
Apr i 1 , 1 9 8 0 . 
My Commissio£xpires: 
-10-t/ 
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